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Abstract
Threshold signature schemes are examples of threshold cryptosystems, as introduced by Desmedt,
[4]. The purpose of this paper is to present a rather simple alternative to threshold signatures
which raises questions about the value of such schemes, at least when applied to the mobile agent
scenario.
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1 Introduction
Threshold signature schemes enable a group of n entities to be given ‘shares’ of a private signature
key in such a way that, for some parameter k (1 ≤ k ≤ n), any subset of k entities can collectively
create a valid signature on a message, whereas any collection of k − 1 or fewer entities cannot.
Schemes of this type have been discussed widely in the literature, and a number of systems have
been proposed; see for example [5] for a brief survey.
One particularly attractive scheme has been recently proposed by Shoup, [5]. This scheme is based
on RSA, and the composite signature can be verified in exactly the same way as a ‘regular’ RSA
signature. In the discussion below we use this scheme as a ‘benchmark’ against which alternatives
can be compared.
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2 Mobile agents and threshold signatures
Much research in recent years has been devoted to the problem of providing security for mobile
agents. The problem is usually divided into two parts:
• protecting the platform on which agents run against malicious and/or unauthorised agents,
• protecting the agents against malicious platforms.
The focus of this note is the second problem, which is usually regarded as the most difficult one to
solve.
Of course, there are limits to the protection that can be offered to an agent. An agent platform can
potentially modify the agent code, and/or interfere with the data stored by an agent. Hence efforts
to protect agents reduce to either finding ways to enhance the level of trust that can be placed in
results produced by an agent, or limiting the powers given to an agent. This paper focuses on the
former approach — in particular it considers the issue of dividing a task amongst multiple agents
to increase the level of trust in the collective results of the agents.
In particular we are concerned with giving all subsets of agents of size k or more the power to sign
on a user’s behalf, without giving smaller groups of agents such a capability. We suppose that the
agents are set up to agree to a transaction, the details of which the agents are to determine. This
might typically occur by giving the agents the power to visit a number of merchants, and find out
which merchant is offering a particular good or service at the lowest price. Some of the agents may
be modified by a malicious host, but we assume that this occurs to at most k − 1 of them.
As discussed in more detail in [1], this seems to be a natural application for the notion of threshold
signatures. The user launching the agents acts as the ‘dealer’ in the threshold signature scheme, and
creates the shares of the signature key. Each agent is equipped with a share, and when a transaction
is to be signed creates a signature share. A third party (e.g. the merchant making the transaction)
receives the signature shares and uses them to construct a valid signature. This distribution of
trust across a multiplicity of agents reduces the threat from small numbers of malicious hosts, who
might be capable of manipulating agent computations. Finally note that this problem also relates
to the well-known concept of a multisignature which, for our purposes at least, can be regarded as
a special type of threshold signature for the case k = n.
3 An alternative based on conventional signatures
We now consider an alternative solution (in the spirit of [2]) to this trust distribution problem.
Unlike the use of threshold signatures, this solution is wholly based on widely used cryptographic
primitives, namely digital signatures, and hence may be more likely to succeed in practice. It is
also quite general in its specification, allowing the use of any digital signature scheme.
Note that it is implicit to the solution described immediately below, and also to the solutions using
threshold signatures, that the agents are transferred by the user U to the hosts on which they are
to execute by some secure means. This secure transfer should enable the receiving host to check
its integrity and origin, and also should protect the confidentiality of all the sensitive parts of the
agent (most crucially including any embedded secret or private keys).
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3.1 Preparing the agents
Before sending the agents, (which we label A1, A2, . . . , An) user U performs the following steps.
Note that we assume that U has a signature key pair of its own, (SU , PU ) say, and a certificate
CertU for its own public key, PU , signed by a Certification Authority (CA).
1. U generates a signature key pair (Si, Pi) specifically for use by agent Ai.
2. U creates a public key certificate Certi for agent Ai’s public key (Pi), signed using U ’s own
signature key (SU ). This certificate also contains policy information which indicates precisely
the purpose of the certificate, and also the parameter k, indicating the ‘threshold value’ (as
above). It is also likely that this certificate will have a very short lifetime, i.e. it would have
an expiry date very close to the time of issue.
3. U now equips agent Ai with the private signature key Si, and copies of the two certificates
Certi and CertU .
4. Ai is now securely transferred to one or more agent platforms.
3.2 Executing an agent
Now suppose that some subset of k agents decide that they wish to collectively sign a message (e.g.
to commit to a transaction with a merchant) on behalf of user U . Each agent Ai signs the message
using the agent’s private key Si, and the signature is then transferred with the two certificates
Certi and CertU to the entity requiring the signature, e.g. a merchant. The recipient of the agent
signatures, M say, then performs the following steps for each received agent signature.
1. The user’s certificate CertU is verified by M using a trusted copy of the CA’s public key. If
M does not have this CA’s public key, then it will need to be derived by some means, e.g.
using a certificate chain. Next, M then checks that it is prepared to accept a signature from
U , and also checks that the name in the certificate is consistent with the user name received
from the agent.
Note that this step will only need to be performed once for the k agent signatures.
2. The agent’s certificate Certi is verified by M using the copy of U ’s public key obtained in the
first step.
3. The agent finally checks the agent’s signature using the copy of Ai’s public key obtained from
Certi.
The merchant waits until k valid agent signatures have been received (recall that k was encoded in
each agent certificate). The collection of k agent signatures is then deemed to be equivalent to the
signature of the user, and the merchant proceeds with the transaction. The collection of k agent
signatures (with the accompanying certificates) are retained as evidence of the transaction.
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3.3 Remarks on implementation
Before attempting to compare this new scheme with the use of threshold signatures we make some
remarks about the implementation of the scheme.
• Given that the agent key pairs have only a short lifetime, it may be possible to use relatively
short keys. That is, if the signature scheme is RSA based, a short modulus could be used, say
of 512 bits, in the knowledge that factoring the modulus and hence breaking the key would
be infeasible during the key’s lifetime. This would make key generation faster and would
reduce the amount of key information to be transferred. It would also mean that creating
and verifying agent signatures could be made significantly more efficient.
• If a ‘weak’ key pair was used for an agent key, or, more generally, if the certificate for an agent
key pair has a very short period of validity, problems might arise if the agent’s signature is
required to have long term validity, e.g. to provide a non-repudiation service in the event of a
dispute. The ‘standard’ way of resolving this problem is to use a timestamping service to sign
a concatenation of the signature and a timestamp, providing evidence that the signature was
generated during the key’s period of validity. An alternative to using a trusted timestamping
service would be to simply require the agent host to add a timestamp and its signature to
any signatures output by the agent. Not only would this provide evidence about when the
agent signed the message, but it would also enable the merchant receiving the signature to
verify on which host the agent was running. This would appear to be a valuable service in
its own right.
• The scheme as described does not restrict the nature (e.g. value and/or type) of messages
which the agents can collectively sign. However, a restriction could easily be imposed by
including the scope of the agent keys in the respective agent public key certificates.
• This scheme is in some respects analogous to the widely discussed notion of delegation using
special delegation keys — see, for example, [3] for an introduction to delegation issues and
[6] for one approach to the use of delegation keys.
3.4 A brief comparison
We now attempt to briefly compare the efficiency of the above scheme with the efficiency achievable
using the Shoup threshold signature scheme, [5]. For the purposes of the comparison we suppose
that signatures for the scheme in this paper are computed using RSA, and we compare this with the
Shoup RSA-based threshold signature scheme, [5]. To compare the efficiencies of the two schemes
we compare separately the work to be performed by the user U , each agent Ai, and the recipient
of the agent signatures, M .
• User U . For the scheme above, the user will be required to generate one key pair for each
agent Ai, and certify the public keys, i.e. compute n signatures and generate n key pairs.
For the threshold signature scheme of [5], the user is only required to generate at most one
key pair (for the secret key that is shared by the n agents). However, each agent will need
to be equipped with a public key certificate for its share, so that the signature share can be
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verified by the merchant (or whoever combines the signature shares). Hence the user will be
required to generate one key pair and compute n signatures. Note that, whilst key generation
will typically take much longer than computing a signature, key pairs could not only be
made quite small (as discussed above), but could be generated in advance. Hence, the new
scheme, whilst requiring more computation overall, actually requires comparable amounts of
computation at the time of agent creation.
• Agent Ai. For the new scheme, the agent is required to compute one signature. For the Shoup
scheme, each agent is required to perform one exponentiation, equivalent to one signature.
• Recipient of agent signatures M . For the new scheme the recipient of the signed message
will be required to verify k + 1 certificates (the user certificate and the k agent certificates)
and k signatures, i.e. a total of 2k + 1 signature verifications. For the Shoup scheme it
is also necessary to verify the user’s certificate, as well the k agent certificates and the k
signature shares. Hence the two schemes have roughly comparable computational efficiencies.
Of course, the storage efficiency for the scheme described above will be rather less than for
the Shoup scheme, unless it is necessary to retain the signature shares for auditing purposes.
In summary it would appear that, in efficiency terms, the scheme of this paper is really quite
comparable with the Shoup threshold signature scheme, with two exceptions. Initialising the scheme
requires a number of key generations, which, however, could be done ‘off-line’. The other difference
is in the size of storage required for signatures, which is significantly larger for the new scheme.
However, this advantage disappears if the signature shares must be kept for auditing purposes.
Indeed, this is not such an unlikely scenario, since, in the event of a dispute, it will be valuable to
learn which agents took part in the signing process. Thus the implementation efficiency differences,
which could be rather minor in practice, could easily be outweighed by the advantages inherent in
using established cryptographic primitives.
Finally observe that one other difference between the approach proposed here and the use of
threshold signatures relates to the issues of anonymity and accountability. In most threshold
signature schemes, the verifier of the signature cannot determine which of the k shareholders
created the signature, whereas with the above approach there is no anonymity for agents. In
some circumstances the anonymity property may be desirable, but in many agent applications the
reverse is likely to be true. That is, the originator of the agents will in many cases wish to have
the means to determine which agents performed actions on its behalf.
4 Concluding remarks
A pragmatic alternative to ‘threshold signatures’ problem has been proposed. This alternative has
potential practical advantages by comparison with the use of threshold signatures, and appears
to offer a very similar set of security guarantees. Although the analysis was performed within the
context of mobile agents, it is possible that the scheme described here is competitive with the Shoup
threshold signature scheme in other environments.
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